Introduction
Compared with the rest of the United Kingdom, Wales' rural areas are more important, and also quite markedly different. One feature of this divergence is that forty years of European Union membership have left Wales ill-prepared for detachment from the restrictive framework of its supranational territorial policies. Devolution did offer scope for the spatially sensitive strategies that would have promoted progress on rural development in Wales, as Bristow (2000) argued almost two decades ago. Yet there has been a lack of advance in this direction. Blame can be partly attached to the way in which the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has evolved, especially its Second Pillar. Partly, also, much of this framework has only weakly affected the real lives of rural people, whereas policy inadequacy in areas such as transport, planning and taxation has been more influential.
While there will be a new range of uncertainties to deal with, during and after exit from the EU, the opportunity to establish a better integration of public action to support and nurture rural development should not be wasted. The CAP has aimed at a notional EU average, and especially after EU expansion, is not and indeed never has been a viable framework for any actual existing member state. With mounting problems, layer upon layer of additions, modifications and constraints have been superimposed, none of which alleviated the inherent failure of its financial, spatial and environmental dimensions, and many of which made its problems worse.
This article examines a few lessons that should have been learned about rural development policy, and speculates about possible directions for its future development. It begins by deconstructing some potent myths about rural development that act as barriers to achieving spatial justice in Wales. Discussion then turns to how to establish more nuanced principles for policy development and possible choices for implementation beyond 2019.
Four potent myths
The first myth that should be tackled is the (often held, mostly subconscious) idea that a rural economy exists in a somehow tangible form, as if it were a discrete, though smaller, version of regional economies such as Scotland, or Greater London. Abolishing this myth requires argument based on the branch of economics concerned with input-output relationships. This has the basic premise that a change in demand for the final outputs of an economic system will cause a ripple effect, stimulating further changes in outputs of the upper branches of vertically linked industries. For example, a change in demand for milk will affect dairy farmers' demands for inputs of power, feed, fertiliser; and each of these would in turn affect their demand for inputs (Richardson, 1985) . It is also possible to identify forward linkages (Papadas and Dahl, 1999) , where a supply source of raw material is altered by a positive or negative shock, affecting downstream industries. Continuing the example, the availability of more milk requires more processing, storage and distribution capacity, and vice-versa.
However, this process is limited by spatial scale. Some outputs are sold outside of the spatial economic system being considered, and proportions of various inputs are also sourced externally. (Midmore, 1993) , but the proportion that stays within a rural area is limited. Evidence of biregional rural-urban systems (Espinosa et al., 2014) shows pronounced leakages: the effects of agriculture and the CAP spending it has attracted were insignificant. In the United States, observed rural multiplier effects have been compared with model-based predictedions. Kilkenny and Partridge's (2009) review shows that, rather than an anticipated positive impact, the outturn is in some cases negative (i.e. the value of the impact multiplier is less than unity). Bizarrely, in some cases at least, developments intended to stimulate economic activity in rural areas have led to its decline.
The last two myths are opposing facets related to a single issue. One asserts that rural areas suffer from significant spatial inequality (e.g. National Assembly for Wales, 2008) ; the other contends that rural populations' location decisions are voluntary, based on significant wealth and attraction to the amenity that rural life offers (e.g. Welsh Government, 2008) . Pateman, for example, noted, "… it is difficult with the available data to assess whether rural-urban differences represent genuine free choices in lifestyles, or traps that make it difficult to live how one would like" (2011: 72). The reality is more complicated, since not only are both aspects of the myth to an extent simultaneously true, but their interaction also produces outcomes that are hard to detect. Statistical evidence, as constructed for example in the Wales Index of Multiple Deprivation (Welsh Government, 2015; Williams and Doyle, 2016 ) is inadequate, since it fails to fully grasp the extent of rural disadvantage due to sparsity and heterogeneity of the population of rural areas. Guinjoan et al. (2016) contend that this problem stems, at least in part, from existing definitions of rural development that focus on inter-rather than intra-spatial equity. Average economic, social and cultural conditions and quality of life of the resident population often compare favourably with the whole of society. Rural people are healthier, live longer, have better life satisfaction on average than their urban counterparts (Sørensen, 2014) . However, if rural development is a process by which all rural residents have the opportunity to achieve a material and cultural life broadly equivalent to that of the urban populations, and the two contradictory variants of the third myth can at least in some contexts be concurrently valid, it would be logically impossible for intervention based on the former myth not to adversely affect those affected by the latter, and vice-versa.
Rural development and public policies
The Second Pillar of the CAP, misleadingly also titled the Rural Development Programme, devotes the main (and in Wales the largest) part of its resources to payments to farmers through agri-environment schemes. The rest of rural development policy is mostly focused on infrastructure, with the rationale of improving rural growth potential and thereby raising employment and incomes. Historically, the balance of policy has favoured hard transport and industrial infrastructures, lowering haulage costs and providing opportunities for urban investors to create employment, to promote more balanced territorial development. This characterised the approach of the Development Board for Rural Wales, and also that of the Welsh Development Agency, both before and after its merger with the former (Hughes, 1998 (Cloke et al., 2000; Milbourne and Cloke, 2013 On pragmatic grounds, these arguments suggest that there is a case for at least some state intervention to achieve territorial justice. In the longer term, there are many issues that could better be managed with an enhanced rural-urban balance of opportunity: managing demographic change in the countryside, relief of urban congestion pressures, and reduced rural tourism impacts, to identify just a few. The barrier to achieving such resolution appears to be an absence of effective championing of the case for policy intervention.
As noted at the beginning of this section, the Wales Rural Development Programme currently devotes a very small proportion of its expenditure to anything other than Glastir, the agrienvironment scheme. Of the non-agricultural elements, the LEADER programme which promotes participatory action for local rural development and small additions for enhancing rural broadband and village renewal, amount in total to less than 5% of Pillar 2 spending. It is paradoxical and perplexing that the LEADER programme, which despite some setbacks (Granberg et al., 2016) has been the most effective in generating impacts, is given such a relatively small share of the budget. This could be a result of the malign influence of the Fontainebleau Agreement, providing the UK with a rebate on the difference between its contributions to and receipts from the European Union budget. The consequence is that, the more expenditure there is on European programmes, the less of a rebate there will be, and so the Treasury has been particularly reluctant to sanction discretionary elements of this type. A thriving portfolio of LEADER projects could have generated a strong advocacy constituency for the Welsh countryside, but several decades of under-funding and relentless requirements for reinvention have diminished that potential. After 2019, there will be two relevant changes. The Fontainebleau rebate will no longer constrain rural spending; conversely, though, the requirement to use a set proportion of rural development funding for LEADER projects will no longer apply. How these two forces interact is by no means clear, but the likelihood of less rather than more spending on effective rural development policies is a possibility that should be envisaged.
Four principles for rural development policy
The arguments of the preceding sections should bolster the capacity for improved rural advocacy. This penultimate section suggests the four main principles on which a postBrexit rural development policy in Wales could be based. Drawing on the chronologically dynamic perspective of spatial socioeconomic change, the first of these is that any intervention should be knowledge-based. It should require a clear, coherent understanding of specific local rural dynamics and dimensions, leading to locally-adapted interventions which the LEADER Programme attempted to facilitate. Following from this, and requiring that the first principle is satisfied, the second principle requires participation. As much power as possible should be devolved to as low a level of spatial disaggregation as is possible. It is paradoxical that the LEADER Programme was initially not meant to be participatory (Midmore, 1998) , but in its first incarnation (apart from the few instances where local government was in control from the start) that experimental dimension proved to be the most useful and effective approach (Ray, 2000) . Only when the flavour of participation was introduced as a hallmark of subsequent extensions of the policy did local authority control -in the United Kingdom at least -make LEADER just another grant giver for schemes requiring the full panoply of EU application bureaucracy.
In general terms, windfall concentration of assets, chiefly housing, in the postwar baby-boom generation (Hoolachan and McKee, 2018) seem to have driven population dynamics outside of urban areas, resulting in a process of spatial demographic redistribution. Local structures of power and governance -especially where ventures of this kind are vulnerable to hijacking by middle class elites -should be considered in policy design, to ensure that spatial justice is not subverted by capture by sectional interests.
A strong participatory dimension provides the best shield against the rural development myths and the most hope of effective and locally-adapted innovation.
The third principle is that policy interventions should be designed for the long term. Recognising that rural milieu are not static, the base of knowledge invoked in the first principle needs time to evolve, and it takes time for this to accumulate. Participatory effectiveness which fulfils the second principle is similarly accumulative. This principle could be the hardest to defend as Brexit is likely to produce more concentrated and deeper shifts in policy than so far experienced in modern times, particularly in the framework for agricultural and rural affairs; more, even, than accession to the EU in 1973.
Sustained interventions are also difficult to support across changes of administration along the electoral cycle, and the even more frequent intraadministration changes of policy emphasis due to turnover of the responsible ministers. To achieve a stable policy environment, the experience of the fixedterm environmental contracts with farmers that overlap policy regimes could be instructive, committing future administrations to continue with existing policy but giving scope for long-term adjustment.
The main question would be the identity of the contractor, and how such an entity could be held to account for fulfilling the contractual obligation.
Voluntary associations, the mainstay of participatory rural development, are fragile in all respects apart from the social capital that they can accrue. Local government is a fine institution (Font and Galais, 2011) 
Conclusions
The lessons that emerge from this discussion appear easy to draw but much more difficult to implement. Economic development processes are not aspatial, however uncomfortable that may be to the standard neoclassical economist. More knowledge about how these processes occur would result in better policies. Yet the gap between these simple insights and the policy mindset could not be more starkly expressed than in the Welsh Government consultation on post-Brexit policy (2018). It fails, noticeably, to mention spatial diversity, nor the role of inequity in driving patterns of economic change in the countryside, and implicitly assumes that the interests of farming are preeminent in the economic functioning of the countryside. Its twin pillars reflect the old division of the CAP. Aid for investment is to replace basic income payments, even though many farms, driven by tax regimes, are already overcapitalised (Guan et al, 2009) . The balance of policy will shift to support for ecosystem services production, despite notorious difficulties in outcome measurement (Bateman and Balmford, 2018) . The nonagricultural part of rural economic activity, so often an afterthought in the implementation of the EU CAP, appears to have been forgotten completely. Thus, as realistic and desirable an informed and effective rural advocacy might be, there is clearly a long road to travel before it is achieved. 
